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Admissibility vs. Weight in Scientific Testimony 
 
David L. Faigman1 
 
Fundamental to all evidence codes is the distinction between 
admissibility and weight. Judges decide admissibility, and, if the 
evidence is admitted, jurors decide what weight to give it. Hence, a 
“dying declaration” that is hearsay is only admissible if the judge 
determines, among other things, that the statement was made by a 
declarant “while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent.”2 
This predicate issue of whether the defendant believed death was 
imminent is called a “preliminary fact,” one that the judge must 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence. If admitted, the 
weight, if any, that should be accorded the particular dying 
declaration is up to the jury to decide. 
This division of responsibilities between judge and jury also 
applies to scientific evidence presented by experts. Although 
fundamental to all evidentiary decisions, this distinction received 
little attention in courts’ consideration of experts until the Supreme 
Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 
Daubert, interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, held that judges 
are “gatekeepers” and obligated to determine whether the methods 
and principles underlying proffered expert testimony are—more 
likely than not—reliable and valid.4 The Court thus treated the 
evidentiary reliability of the scientific evidence proffered in the case 
as a preliminary fact and thus within the judge’s purview to 
determine. 
In contrast to the usual preliminary-fact determination, however, 
the complex nature of scientific evidence has created substantial 
confusion among courts about just where the judge’s authority to 
decide admissibility ends and the jury’s responsibility to assess 
weight begins. Daubert endeavored to set this line by instructing 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from David L. Faigman, Christopher 
Slobogin & John Monahan, Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of 
Scientific Research to Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in 
Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (2016). 
2. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
4. Id. at 589. 
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judges to “focus . . . solely on principles and methodology, not on the 
conclusions that they generate.”5 This distinction between 
methodology and principles on the one hand and conclusions on the 
other has assumed major significance. Many courts believe that the 
methodology-conclusions distinction provides a useful guide for 
distinguishing the judge’s role from that of the jury. However, the 
Court itself abandoned this distinction just four years after Daubert 
in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,6 and the 2000 amendments to Rule 
702 made no mention of it. 
 
Using Science to Guide Scientific Testimony 
 
In fact, the methodology-conclusions distinction has no 
principled basis in science and thus should have none in law. Since 
the distinction does not align with the nature of the evidence that 
scientists proffer in court, it is destined to fail and should be 
explicitly jettisoned. In its place, courts should adopt a framework 
that is consonant with the structure of science itself. 
The structure of scientific evidence has one central characteristic: 
science is general in nature because it involves study of categories of 
individuals or cases rather than study of a single individual or case. 
Generalization permeates the scientific enterprise, cutting across 
methodology, principles, and conclusions. In a nutshell, then, the 
legally relevant issue of whether, say, benzene can cause leukemia is 
a general question that involves the methods, principles, and 
conclusions embedded in the research. If the answer to this question 
is affirmative, there remains the methodology, principles, and 
conclusions on the ultimate issue of whether a specific plaintiff’s 
leukemia was caused by benzene exposure. 
This insight regarding the fundamental generality of science has 
an important consequence for the distinction between admissibility 
and weight. In short, scientific procedures and principles, as well as 
any conclusions of general application that are derived from them, 
ought to be evaluated by judges, not by juries that sit on a single 
case. 
                                                 
5. Id. at 595. 
6. 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology are 
not entirely distinct from one another.”). 
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It is a well-established aspect of our modern jury system that, 
while laypeople are in charge of finding facts specific to the case at 
hand, courts are in charge of ascertaining legal rules that will have 
application to other cases. This allocation is based in part on an 
assessment of the relative capacities of judges and juries and in part 
on a desire for uniformity across cases. The same rule should apply 
for facts that will have application to other cases, for the same 
reasons. 
Acceptance of this proposition means that the role of the judge 
and jury should depend not on a distinction between methodology 
and conclusion but on the distinction between the general and the 
specific. The reliability that Daubert, Joiner, and Rule 702 all require 
the judge to determine as a preliminary fact entails assessing every 
aspect of scientific evidence, not just its methodology or some other 
subset of the testimony. 
At the same time, the general-specific distinction that derives 
from the nature of scientific inference also means that, whether they 
involve methods or conclusions, factual disputes that relate solely to 
the case at hand are for the jury to assess. Thus, whether an expert in 
the instant case actually applied the methodology that the judge 
found valid generally is a matter of weight, as is any conclusion the 
expert reaches that is applicable to the litigants.7 
For example, in the controversial area of “shaken baby 
syndrome,”8 an expert’s assertion that research indicates that 
subdural hematoma, retinal bleeding, and brain swelling, when they 
appear together, are indicative of child abuse is a general proposition 
and a matter of admissibility; an expert’s assertion that the victim in 
the case had this triad of symptoms, however, is a case-specific 
assertion and thus a matter of weight.  
                                                 
7. The only caveat here is the traditional one that the judge may keep 
any issues from the jury when no rational jury could credit the expert’s 
assertions about them.  FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
8. Compare Sandeep K. Naveng et al., A Daubert Analysis of 
Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome – Part II: An Examination of 
the Differential Diagnosis, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 203, 207 (2013) 
(finding the science fundamentally sound) with Keith A. Findley et al., 
Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma and Actual Innocence: 
Getting it Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 213 (2012) (finding 
the science fundamentally unsound). 
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Likewise, in a case involving testimony about DNA, the 
assertion that a particular method of testing DNA is reliable is of 
general import and a matter of admissibility, while an opinion 
regarding a case-specific fact, such as whether the technician 
properly labeled the samples prior to testing, is a matter of weight. A 
labor economist in an employment-discrimination case who 
admittedly fails to control for a key variable such as seniority or 
wage structure in a regression analysis has committed a general error 
that should lead to exclusion by a judge; but determining whether the 
economist did in fact include such a variable, or whether he or she 
obtained accurate information about the variable, is an assessment 
that should be carried out by the jury. 
 
Specifying the Boundaries of the Admissibility-Weight Distinction 
 
Although the proposal described here is entirely consistent with 
the current version of the Federal Rules, the following test sets forth 
clearly the boundary between a judge’s obligation to determine 
admissibility and the jury’s task to assess weight: 
 
Preliminary facts that describe the principles or methods of 
scientific research or generally applicable conclusions drawn 
therefrom are within the judge’s responsibility to decide as a 
matter of admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a) and equivalent state rules. Conditional facts that 
describe whether the expert adhered to a reliable principle or 
method are matters of weight and within the province of the 
trier of fact to decide if a reasonable trier of fact could find 
that the fact is true, as provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(b). 
 
This approach to the admissibility-weight issue in expert 
testimony cases has three important benefits. First, it aligns squarely 
with the purposes of evidence codes and the Constitution’s due-
process and right-to-jury provisions by making optimal use of the 
relative competencies of judges and juries. Juries will be prevented 
from hearing unreliable evidence and, at the same time (assuming the 
expert testimony is admitted), will be given full authority to decide 
facts relevant to the case before them. 
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Second, the division suggested by the structure of scientific 
inference implements the key goal of ensuring uniformity between 
cases regarding general propositions of science. 
Third, and possibly more important for a rule of evidence, this 
approach has the benefit of clarity. The current focus on attempting 
to distinguish methodology from conclusions leaves courts in a 
quandary because, as a scientific matter, methodology and 
conclusions are not always separable. The proposed alternative is 
more straightforward: when the statement of fact (or inference) that 
is asserted to support proffered expert opinion transcends the instant 
case, it is a preliminary fact to be decided by the court under Rule 
104(a). When the statement of fact (or inference) that is asserted to 
support proffered opinion is pertinent only in the instant case (after a 
judge has found that it is the product of reliable principles and 
methods), it is a question of weight and only subject to review under 
Rule 104(b) as a matter of conditional relevance. 
